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FAULTY FRAMEWORK: CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENCE
MODEL FOR WOMEN IN THE LAW*
CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN**
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to consider the place of women in the lawyering
workplace without addressing the larger issue of categorical thinking about
gender in the society. Both in theory and practice, gender distinctions
form the underpinning of symbolic' and physical segregation in the

workplace as they do in other parts of social life.2 The paradigm of
difference that specifies a set of essential differences between the sexes is
central to the discussion.3

Age-old, and integrated into all aspects of daily life and discourse, the
belief that men and women have emotional and intellectual attributes that
are sex-linked is relevant to the role of women in law as practitioners,

victims, clients, and citizens, as it is relevant to their participation in all

other social institutions. 4 The difference paradigm is located in common

myths, in received knowledge, in political ideology, and in public policy.'
* Presented at New York Law School Law Review's Symposium on Women in the
Lawyering Workplace: Feminist Considerations and Practical Solutions (March 15, 1990).
** Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Graduate Center, City University of New
York.
1. For a detailed discussion of the concept of symbolic segregation, see C. EPSTEIN,
DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEx, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 215-31 (1988).

2. See C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1983). The labeling of social roles as
appropriately performed by either men or women creates difficulties for those who enter
a profession traditionally associated with the other sex. Id. at 276. Higher moral standards
are attributed to women who are considered too "good" to be tough-minded negotiators and
are encouraged to perform "good works" which are low in prestige and career potential.
Id. at 268-69. Women are channeled into "female specialties" such as matrimonial and
family law, legal aid work, custody cases, and estate work. Id. at 110. Women are
expected to hold an inferior position to men, and those who show ambition puzzle their
male associates. Id. at 274. See infra pp. 327-34.
3. See generally C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1.
4. For a discussion in depth, see Epstein, Strong Arms and Velvet Gloves: The Gender
Difference Model and the Law, MILON COLLOQUIUM: THE INVISIBLE MAjORITy 5 (Spring
1990).
5. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 102-31. Prevailing ideas of proper masculine or
feminine behavior influence the social choices available to the individual. Thus, a man will
be father-husband-steelworker-veteran, while a woman is wife-mother-teacher-volunteer
worker. Id. at 102-04. Some social scientists theorize a universe where men and women
have equivalent power, but only in their separate spheres. Id. at 111. See also Jacquette,
PoliticalScience, 2 SIGNS 147 (1976).
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It is also lodged in the domain of the sciences where claims to objectivity
are assumed. 6 This belief structures, orders, socializes, and controls
behavior with consequences to the individual and to the society. Because
of it, men and women have different access to opportunity, resources,
power, and justice in the spheres of employment, political life, family, and
education.
The conceptual boundaries that define "male" and "female" in the
difference paradigm are only casually linked to biological factors.
Extending far beyond sexuality and reproduction,7 its assumptions
associate personality and intellectual traits, such as sentimentality or
assertiveness, with one or the other sex in spite of the fact that almost no
traits are exclusively held by only one sex and, indeed, that men and
women do not differ at all with regard to the possession of most traits. Of
course, men and women may demonstrate patterned behavior consistent
with the difference paradigm, but we now have considerable evidence that
indicates the behavior is not irrevocably determined by physiology or early
socialization.'
I propose that most differences between women and men in the
professions and other spheres of society come not from the organic
qualities of the human body or the deeply rooted attributes of psyches
distinct for each sex, but from the strong arm of the law, from social
force or its threat, and from the mechanisms that provide the subtle
restraints and persuasions of social life. This keeps men and women in
line with social definitions and expectations. Many differences are merely
assumed, and either do not actually exist or are so superficial that they
change as opportunities and views change. To more directly address the
common view based on ideological commitments, the findings of outdated
research or biased observations, males and females no longer differ in
many characteristics long regarded as basic, such as verbal ability, math
ability, and spatial relations.9 Yet many claims for difference continue to

6. Scientific studies report more differences than similarities between the sexes because
they are oriented to look for differences. For a report on differences between the sexes, see
E. MACCOBY & C. JACKIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEx DIFERENCES (1974).

7. A number of soco-biologists and psychoanalysts do make claims for distinctions
based on physiology or deeply rooted sex-based associations. See generally C. EPSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 17-98.
8. Rather, it is an outcome of constant persuasion and coercion and is amenable to
alteration with changing social conditions and social controls. See id. at 99-135.
9. See Hyde & Linn, Gender Differences in Verbal Ability: A Meta-Analysis, 104
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 53, 62, 64 (1988) (study of gender differences in verbal and
mathematical ability). Men and women probably do not vary much in emotional qualities
either; differences in emotions are assumed rather than tested, and where tested, these
differences are often poorly conceived and executed. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 7298.
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be made and are widely subscribed to, and overall, they are embedded in
both feminist and traditional psychoanalytic thought.'
This Article will draw on examples from the past and the present to
indicate the consequences that the difference model has had in the legal
sphere. There has been considerable change in the way the difference
model is used and there are many who now contest it. Although the
formal social arrangements that guaranteed segregation of the sexes have
diminished, many informal practices still are employed to enforce
difference. These are executed by powerful gatekeepers of ideas" and by
the dominated themselves. This is evidenced by the viewpoint of a number
of feminist women who are compliant in perpetuating the difference
model, although their thinking on the matter turns around the previously
inferred presumption of inferiority. 2 Although in the past many argued
that women's presumed different nature indicated their deficiencies, today
many who presume differences argue their advantage.' 3 Nevertheless, the
difference model is a social construction that I believe inevitably leads to
social inequality.
Furthermore, this Article will explore law as a site to demonstrate
how women as practitioners, clients, victims, and citizens are affected by
the ideology and practice of difference. Although this Article will
concentrate on women as legal practitioners, law is only one example of
a more general phenomenon. I am particularly concerned about the
reversal of the orientation toward equality and the renewal of the
prejudices of the past underscoring differences between women and men.
Current material culture embodies a nostalgia for its nineteenth century
past, and there has been a revival of Victorian culture in the
characterization of women.' 4 The notion of the "good woman," whose
high-mindedness puts her above the vulgarity and profit maximization of
ordinary life and who is the upholder of the moral order,' 5 has found its
10. Specifically, these claims are rooted in the theory that women and men have
different orientations and therefore different perspectives on nurturance, morality, and
justice. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 76-77. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
11. "Intellectuals are gatekeepers of ideas and fountainheads of ideology . . . ." L.
COSER, MEN OF IDEAS: A SOCIOLOGIST'S VMW, at x (1965). See also C. EPSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 10 (using Coser's term to define those, who through their control over
intellectual discourse, create distinctions between men and women and give value to these
distinctions, thereby pressuring people to behave according to others' expectations).
12. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 19-21.
13. Id. at 52-54.
14. See, e.g., W. KAMINER, A FEARFUL FREEDOM: WOMEN'S FuGHT FROM
EQUAlITY (1990). The growth of a conservative ideology resistent to change and support
by recent Supreme Court decisions restricting rights to abortion and equal employment may
foree feminists either to rationalize domesticity or to focus exclusively on the drive for
reproductive choice. Id. at 213.
15. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 268-76 (views about women as "good persons"
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way back, not only to the common discourse and the discourse of
influential feminist scholars and critical legal theorists, but also back into
the debates in the courts and legislatures.
II. DECEPTIVE DIsTINcTIONs

Not limiting the use of categories such as "masculine" and "feminine"
(interchangeably with "male" and "female") to matters linked to biological
reproduction and sexuality creates distinctions. These concepts become
reified, and the conceptual boundaries, as a result of social decisions, are
not only generally regarded as real, but worse, as inevitable.
Of course, categories and distinctions are necessary for analysis in
science as well as in everyday social communication. Distinctions in
culture need not lead to invidious comparison, and they often do not when
categorizing the inanimate world. But those used in categorizing people
inevitably do. This does not happen by chance, or by the laws of nature,
but rather because of people defending or pressing their advantages.
Steven Lukes has drawn attention to the agenda-setting factor in power,
and to the latent third dimension of power that establishes the values, the
climate, and the background in which decisions are made.16 Indeed, as
Dale Spender points out, reality is defined and interpreted by those in
power.' Particular kinds of distinctions, such as those dichotomous
models that distinguish between blacks and whites, free people and slaves,
men and women, are particularly powerful in creating and maintaining
differences.
For example, although they do not discuss gender issues, modern
social theorists such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu have focused
on classification systems and how they structure reality." Bourdieu and
his associates, in their work on cultural reproduction, show the ways in
which dominated groups contribute to their own subordination because of
class-differentiated mental structures.19 Dichotomous thinking plays an
often are fixed on the quality of their roles as mothers).
16. See generally S. LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
17. D. Spender, Educational Research and the Female Perspective (1978) (paper
presented at the British Association Conference on Women, Education, and Research,
University of Leicester).
18. For a discussion of Foucault, Bourdieu, and a number of other European writers
on the agenda-setting elements in cultural modalities, see Lamont & Wuthnow, Betwixt and
Between: Recent Cultural Sociology in Europe and the United States, in FRONTIERS OF
SOCIAL THEORY: THE NEW SYNTHESES 287 (G. Ritzer ed. 1990).
19. Id. at 297. These mental structures, called habitus, are a function of classdifferentiated dispositions and categories of perception shaped by conditions of existence.
Id. See also P. BOuRDIEu, DISTINCION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF

TASTE 169-225 (R. Nice trans. 1984). Entrenched in the dominant symbolic system which
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important part in the definition of women as "others," as deviants, and in
their self-definitions.' °
Although they were not the first to do so, Foucault, Bourdieu, and
other European cultural theqrists defined power as the ability to impose a

specific definition of reality which is disadvantageous to others, 2 ' or the

capacity to structure the situation of others so as to limit their autonomy
and life chances.' These writers are concerned with "the power to frame
alternatives and contain opportunities, to win and shape consent, so that

the granting of legitimacy to the dominant classes appears not only
spontaneous but natural and normal."'I They are also concerned with the

structural effects of culture, whether it be cultural signals or ideology,
which affect people's positioning in the stratification system.' Foucault's

writings reconstruct how discourse shapes and structures subjectivity and
how classification systems structure reality.2s

This approach shows how power is ubiquitous in social life, operating
at the micro-level in face-to-face relationships and at the macro-level of

social reality. This is particularly salient in the case of gender issues, since
laws and rules segregate men and women in various institutional spheres,
and they also are positioned in the course of ordinary sociability governed

contribute to its reproduction are binary oppositions, such as rare/common,
interested/disinterested, and vulgar/noble, which value the experiences and attributes of the
dominant class. Lamont & Wuthnow, supra note 18, at 297.
20. See generally C. EPSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE: OPTIONS AND LIMITS IN
PROFESSIONAL CAREERS (1970) (a woman who has proved her capabilities in training faces
weighing whether to begin a career that almost inevitably will involve a conflict with
traditional images of her place in society and her own images of personal fulfillment, and
once past these barriers, she may be forced to repeatedly review her decision as she faces
successive conflicts between her personal life and career); C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at
103, 152-56 (where women are found to constitute a distinct numerical minority in an
occupation they are regarded as deviant, not fitting into a sex-typed role viewed as properly
female; women are treated differently and are thereby discouraged from escaping their low
rank in society and careers); Epstein, Ideal Roles and Real Roles or the Fallacy of the
Misplaced Dichotomy, in 4 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND MOBIITY 29
(1985).
21. Bourdieu's "symbolic violence" is an example. Lamont & Wuthnow, supra note
18, at 295.
22. Poucault's "regime" is a demonstration of this structuring. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Hall, Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and
Problems, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE 38 (1984)); C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23,
102, 106-07 (mindless acceptance of popular views, such as employers' beliefs that certain
occupations require the characteristics of one sex over another, has permitted sex labels to
be learned and perpetuated throughout our socialization creating cultural sex-based biases
which keep women in nurturant and service-oriented roles regarded as ancillary to men's).
24. Lamont & Wuthnow, supra note 18, at 295.
25. Id. at 294-301.
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by the latent rules of social interaction.' The way in which writers such
as Bourdieu, Foucault, and other European cultural theorists define power
is not measured by the occurrence of unwilling compliance, and is not
limited -to affecting others' behavior.'
The social inequality that women face, like other kinds of social
inequality, has been validated by many people because it is defined as
natural.' Or, for those less "scientifically-minded," the different
positions of men and women in society are based on God's will or the
order of nature. Yet, ironically, although believed to be natural, the power
structure and the division of labor have been backed and enforced by the
law of most lands, the social customs of most peoples, and the rules of
most communities. Furthermore, the social pressures exerted by the
significant others in intimate associations reinforce traditional social
arrangements and hierarchy. Social pressure also assures that men and
women demonstrate expressive behavior appropriate for their sex. Thus,
the patterned differences we see in the different kinds of work men and
women do in the public and private spheres, in their demeanor, and even
in their styles of speech, are not a product of inborn differences or even
deeply conditioned ones. They are deceptive distinctions,' because they
are socially imposed, regulated, and enforced, and because they are more
superficial than is commonly believed.
Yet people not only believe in difference, they insist on it. Thus, this
belief is embedded in our discourse and our institutions, including the
institutions of science. Scientific thinking, however, has been a doubleedged sword in the debates about difference between the sexes. The biases
within science have provided legitimacy for policies that have
disadvantaged women with regard to access to professional training and
research and in the reward system. But the commitment to self-reflection
by scientists has also provided the forum for challenging traditional
patterns.

26. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 106-07 (a social stratification system directing
men and women into roles, subjected women to obstacles keeping them out of fields
socially defined as male, and prevented women from attaining positions of power in a
culture where "only men ought to be in charge").
27. Lamont & Wuthnow, supra note 18, at 295. Influencing their situation or position
in the social structure in a disadvantageous way is conceived as a more pervasive and
important way of exercising power. Id.
28. In other words, social inequality is rooted in the hormones or the brain.
29. See generally C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 233-35 (the categories created
perpetuate gender inequalities by providing an easy and efficient organization of societal
roles, and further, cultural persuasion to accept the role deemed gender appropriate is
accompanied by enforcement and perpetuation of gender based roles).
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A. The Nineteenth Century Viewpoint
The path for a woman to practice law was a difficult one. Although
women could exercise a power of attorney during colonial times, state
courts refused to admit them as members to the state bar associations
during most of the nineteenth century. ° The courts justified the denials
primarily on two grounds.3 ' First, courts were reluctant to break with
traditional English common law;32 in nineteenth century England female
attorneys were unknown.33 A woman had as much chance to become an
attorney as she had to be elected to a seat in the House of Commons, an
apparently unlikely result.' The second rationale was that the bar
admission requirements set forth by the state legislatures were never
intended to include women.35 By interpreting statutes which explicitly
permitted only males to practice law to include women would have been
analogous to creating a "judicial revolution," as opposed to proper
"judicial construction. "I

Despite such obstacles, some women prevailed. In"1869, Arabella A.
Mansfield applied for and received a license to practice law in the State
of Iowa.37 Mansfield's breakthrough, however, did not immediately open
the door for women to practice law in other states. Lavinia Goodell, in her
application to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, relied on Mansfield's
admittance as a precedent in favor of the admission of women to the
practice of law.38 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, was not
persuaded. Chief Justice Edward Ryan reasoned that
[n]ature has tempered women as little for the juridical conflicts of
the court room, as for the physical conflicts of the battlefield.
Womanhood is moulded for gentler and better things.... [O]ur

profession... has essentially and habitually to do with all that
is selfish and malicious, knavish and criminal, coarse and brutal,
repulsive and obscene, in human life. It would be revolting to all
female sense of the innocence and sanctity of their sex, shocking
to man's reverence for womanhood and faith in woman, on which

30. A. SACHS & I. WILSON, SEXISM AND THE LAW 94-95 (1978).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 95.
Id.
In re Bradwell, 55 II. 535, 539 (1869).
A. SACHS & J. WILSON, supra note 30, at 95.
Id.
In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 242 (1875).
A. SACHS & J. WILSON, supra note 30, at 95.
Goodell, 39 Wis. at 238.
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hinge all the better affections and humanities of life, that woman
should be permitted to mix professionally in all the nastiness of
the world which finds its way into courts of justice; all the
unclean issues, all the collateral questions of sodomy, incest,
rape, seduction, fornication, adultery, pregnancy, bastardy,
legitimacy, prostitution, lascivious cohabitation, abortion,
infanticide, obscene publications, libel and .slander of sex,
impotence, [and] divorce .... 11
The Mansfield precedent was rejected, among other reasons, because the
case could not be found in the Iowa state reports.' °
During the same time period Myra Bradwell applied for, and was also
denied, a license as an attorney at law in the State of Illinois. 41 Although
the Illinois Supreme Court admired Bradwell's persistence, and even
sympathized with her tremendous undertaking, the court was unwilling to
change the exclusively male practice whose origin dated back for
centuries. 42 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Illinois decision.' Justice Miller held that the right of admission to
in the state courts was not protected by the privileges and
practice
immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Justice Bradley
concurred in the judgment, leaving no doubt as to the "paramount destiny
and mission" of women.' He stated that "[m]an is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life."'
It was clear that courts would not grant admittance to women unless
the legislative branch explicitly set forth such a proposition. As the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded, "if the legislature shall choose to remove the
existing barriers and authorize us to issue licenses equally to men and
women, we shall cheerfully obey." 47 Shortly after the Supreme Court

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
practice
45.

Id. at 245-46. See also A. SAcHs & J.WILSON, supra note 30, at 96-97.
Goodell, 39 Wis. at 242.
Inre Bradwell, 55 II. 535 (1869).
Id. at 540-42.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
Id. at 139. The Court inferred, however, the possibility of a right for women to
law in federal courts. Id.
Id. at 141. Justice Bradley's complete thought is: "The paramount destiny and

mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator." Id.

46. Id.
47. Inre Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 542 (1869).

1990]

FAULTY FRAMEWORK

decided Bradwell, state legislatures began to do just that. For example, in

1872 the Illinois Legislature passed an act "giving all persons, regardless
of sex, freedom in selecting an occupation."4 Once legislatures made it

clear that women could be licensed to practice law, the state courts made
little objection. In fact, courts appeared willing to explicitly overrule their

former opinions denying women law licenses.49 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in a dramatic reversal from its earlier decision, I finally granted
Lavinia Goodell a license to practice in Wisconsin courts. 5'
Of course, women were eventually admitted to all the other state bars

across the country. But the views about women as unfit for courtroom
strife, or at least more suited to "better things," were still prevalent in the

1960s. 52 They were only seriously challenged in the 1970s,53 and then

reappeared in the 1980s, but in a somewhat different form.

B. A Different Voice
There is a recent surge in the belief of women's "different voice," the

so-called possession of a different moral perspective than that of men.'
Some would say that women resolve moral conflict differently than men
and are more concerned with preserving relationships and satisfying
emotional needs than with parceling out rights.5'

The emphasis on

48. A. SACHS & J.WILSON, supra note 30, at 101. Curiously, Myra Bradwell did not
reapply for a law license after this legislation was passed. For some reason she waited
eighteen more years until she finally applied and was admitted to the Illinois state bar in
1890, only to die four years later. Id.
49. Inre Goodell, 48 Wis. 693 (1879).
50. See supra note 37.
51. Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Ryan, who had authored the denial of Lavinia
Goodell's motion for admittance to the Wisconsin State bar four years earlier, dissented.
What is surprising, however, was that the Chief Justice dissented without opinion. O.M.
Conover, the official reporter, went s6 far as to delay the publication of the Goodell
decision in expectation of Chief Justice Ryan's dissent. The opinion never came. See
Goodell, 48 Wis. at 693 n. 1.
52. A. SACHS & 1. WILSON, supra note 30, at 210.
53. Id. at 219.
54. C. GInGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan's conclusions are based on three studies: (1) a college
student study; (2) an abortion decision study; and (3) a rights and responsibilities study
based on eight boys and eight girls. Id. at 2-3. Her purpose was to "provide, in the field
of human development, a clearer representation of women's development .... [and to offer
women] a representation of their thought that enables them to see better its integrity and
validity, to recognize the experiences their thinking reflects, and to understand the line of
its development." Id. at 3.
55. W. KAMlNER, supra note 14, at 6. This is Kaminer's characterization of Gilligan's
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preserving relationships is believed to account for the disdain for
competition held by women, along with the discomfort it causes.56 This
belief also has a normative component. Women who do compete are not
regarded as "real women" because competition is not "sisterly" and it is
not as selfless as women are supposed to be." Competition requires selfinterest, and "women are supposed to be primarily interested in the
welfare of others."5 8 Indeed, in law today, many writers use the different
voice model to argue that women are more interested in mediative
techniques of conflict resolution than in the adversary combat of the
courtroom.5

There are a number of curious ironies in this position because it
directly conflicts with several other stereotypes. One stereotype is that
women, who have limited access to the sphere of team sports, are usually
faulted for not being good team players. Another view has it that women
are "Queen Bees," and do not help others. However, women have always
competed in society, often in the spheres where men are not competitive.
For example, women compete in school, in beauty contests, when
promoting their children's interests, and even on the' job, yet this
competition does not seem to call this stereotype into question.'°
thesis. "[Women] tend to cultivate a 'morality of responsibility' instead of a 'morality of
rights.'" Id. Gilligan points out that women identify themselves through, and are dependent
on, relationships because the self is delineated through connection, as opposed to men who
are more independent and self-oriented, having the self defined through separation. C.
GILUGAN, supra note 54, at 35, 164. A woman will view a moral problem in terms of
"care and responsibility in relationships," rather than one of rights and rules. Id. at 73.
56. W. KAMINER, supra note 14, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id. ("[w]omen don't compete; they cooperate . . . ."). Similarly, Gilligan's
assertion that a woman's virtue lies in self-sacrifice has "complicated the course of
women's development by pitting the moral issues of goodness against the adult questions
of responsibilities and choice." C. GILUGAN, supranote 54, at 132. Moreover, this notion
of self-sacrifice conflicts with the idea of individual rights which has fueled the women's
movement in this past century. Id.
59. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987). Professor MenkelMeadow reasons that the entrance of women into the legal profession has affected the use
and practice of the law. Women approach moral reasoning from a different perspective than
men. Id. at 44. She proposes that women are more empathic and prefer mediation over the
traditional adversarial system, not only because of a stereotypical fear of conflict, but
because of a desire to care for others and an ability to see legal problems in a greater social
context. Id. 'at 45; see also Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in
Search of Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 905; Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice, 1 BERKIEEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 763
n.28 (1984).
60. My first study of women lawyers, and subsequent interviews over the next decade,
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But challenges to the many assertions about women's and men's
natures have been questioned. Many social scientists have examined the
evidence to find out which assertions had some basis in truth, and which
ones were the products of fantasy or social politics. One aspect of the
investigation was to locate the ideological and methodological biases
inherent in the scientific community which revealed the impact of the
difference model on the social sciences. In science, like the rest of the
world, people with power can define the categories and evaluate them as
well. This is because of the latent agenda-setting factor in power that
establishes the values, the climate, and the background in which decisions
are subsequently made. 6 ' The obviously powerful are those with money,
position, or arms. The less obviously powerful are those who hold the
resources to ideas. In this category stand scholars, humanists, and
scientists. Sometimes power, even in the academy, is obvious, but it may
be so institutionalized and lodged in cultural discourse that people accept
it without question. Of course, sometimes the bias may be lodged in the
research method.62
Today, for example, there is the danger of overgenderizing
everything. The sex variable is computed on most issues often leading to
an assumption of causality that may only reflect a coincident association
of the sex variable with other factors. Invariably, of course, although men
and women from the same background and the same education
substantially agree about most matters, the few percentage points of
difference which may turn up are regarded as all important. Sometimes the
small differences are important for certain purposes. For example, they
could make the difference in an election. But the few percentage points
difference do not inform us about basic differences between the sexes.
Furthermore, many scientists tend to generalize results of particular
studies to the entire population. They report the very small differences
found between the men and women in survey studies and even small

tapped many of the assumptions of the "good woman" thesis expressed by the women
attorneys about themselves (many offered that women were less combative than men),
although this opinion was often not shared by role partners of particular women attorneys.
My own observations revealed that women lawyers, like other human beings, varied in
personality, character, and style. See generally C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2; C. Epstein,
Women and Professional Careers: The Case of the Woman Lawyer (1968) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation) [hereinafter C. Epstein, Ph.D. dissertation].

61. See supra text accompanying note 16.
62. Carol Gilligan, who comes from Harvard and who expresses views that are
consonant with traditional values, is an example of a powerful promulgator of ideas. Of
course she is only one of a long line of scientists who have been affected by bias.
Ironically, she attempted to counter the bias of her mentor Lawrence Kohlberg, whose

assumptions about moral development were skewed because he confined himself to a
sample of males.
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laboratory experiments as if they were true of men and women
universally.'
Another problem comes from a study that depends on people to report
on their own attitudes or behavior.' Not only are observers biased, but
the subjects of their observations are biased as well. People stereotype
themselves. They think of themselves as conforming to popular notions of
how they should be or act. Thus, women and men tend to characterize
themselves according to stereotypes of femininity and masculinity. In my
study of women lawyers and my observations of women in public
activities such as professional meetings, there are numerous contradictions
between many women's assessments of themselves and those of outside
observers.' To give a striking example, one lawyer I interviewed
described herself as especially caring, not an uncommon view; but a male
lawyer who worked with her described her as a "barracuda," also not an
uncommon view of women lawyers in the old days.
It is irresponsible to overgeneralize on the basis of slight average
differences in samples of males and females, and it is probably also
irresponsible to characterize particular people in a unitary manner. Current
wisdom in social psychology shows people to be more complex beings
than many psychological models indicate. Girls and boys, women and
men, may change their views and behavior in different social settings and
during the course of their lives. One may be caring toward a client in the
office, but ruthless against an opposing attorney in the courtroom. A
person may be a daring player on the athletic field, but a cautious advisor
in planning an estate. A woman may be an aggressive tiger in defending
her child, yet reticent as a returning law student. A person may drive by
a person stuck by the side of a road with a flat tire if alone, but stop if
there is someone with him. These examples show that attempts to
characterize a person as aggressive or passive, caring or selfish, are

63. Gilligan's projections suffered from this same misperception. Her overarching
prognosis about the moral character of men and women was based on only three studies.
C. GIaUGAN, supra note 54, at 2-3. One was of eight boys and eight girls who were asked

to interpret a story describing a man who committed a robbery to obtain a drug he couldn't
afford for his dying wife. Id. at 25-26. Another asked 29 pregnant women about their
possible decision to have an abortion. Id. at 3. A third study administered tests concerning
moral conflict to 25 Harvard psychology students. Id. at 2. A methodological critique of

these studies is the appropriateness of the sample to study the question being asked. There
was considerable variation in response among both sexes, which brings into question
whether the subjects can be regarded as representative of men and women. See id. And,

if one looked at the protocols, observers could easily disagree on which choices were fair
and just, as opposed to caring and relational. Each study was based on subjective criteria
and quite susceptible to observer bias.
64. Id.
65. See generally C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2.
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simplistic and do not account for the multiple components of character or
situational factors affecting behavior. Characterizations of personality, as
well as characterizations of gender, tend to be dichotomous and static.
They also tend to confuse the normative with the actual.
A number of legal writers have fallen into this trap as they ask for the
"woman's voice " ' to be integrated into the legal profession.67 From a
value point of view, that would be acceptable if the quality of humanism
were not regarded as "women's work." When humanism is identified as
feminine, then gender ideology compels men not to exhibit this behavior
for fear of being wimps. As for women who express humanistic concerns,
they are regarded as sentimental and impractical or their requests are
labeled as "special interests," as the 1988 presidential election
conceptualized them.'
This is not the forum in which to give a full account of
methodological and theoretical biases on the gender issue in the social
science literature, or to fully debate the merits of the scholarship cited
above.' But it is important to note the caution that ought to be exercised
in assessing research and its applications that pose male and female,
masculine and feminine, as polar extremes. These conceptions lead to and
reinforce social constructions of gender as dichotomous categories and
mask the ideological and agenda setting components. They assume
difference as a given, rather than as a result of a process with considerable
rooting in law.
Law is an important sphere to consider because it provides definitions
and parameters for gender distinctions and social ordering, as well as the
means for holding the distinctions in place. Most, if not all, cultures hold
that men and women are suited to distinctive social roles, and that these
are extensions of the laws of Nature or of some Divine Will. Yet all

66. That is, the expression of caring and sensitivity to people's relationships identified
by Gilligan. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (law is experiencing a reshaping in
women's terms); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CmI. L. REV. 1 (1988)
(patriarchal jurisprudence delimits women creating need to transform masculine
jurisprudence into human jurisprudence); Whitman, Law and Sex, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1388
(1988) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987)).
68. In the 1988 elections, there were 10 million more women of voting age than men,
demonstrating that women are not just a special-interest group out on the fringe. George
and the Gender Gap, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 26, 1988, at 15, col. 1; see also Pear,
King's Dream: How Civil Rights Came to Be a Special Interest, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1988, § 4, at 1, col. 2.
69. For an in-depth discussion of the sociology of the scientific analysis of sex and
gender, see C. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 17-45.
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societies take great care to establish laws, or rules where no formal body
of law exists, to ensure that individuals' real roles come close to the
culture's ideal roles.7'

Public policy and laws specify how and when the sexes may and may
not mingle. This includes the conditions of many of men's and women's
most intimate interactions which set the stage for women's access to
professional life and their treatment within it. The laws may not always
be enforced, and there may be infringements of them, but the knowledge
that punishments are on the books for those who deviate impels people to
conform.
Law has also been an instrument for breaking down barriers and
removing distinctions, as we have witnessed in the past two or three
decades. But no society leaves women and men entirely free to choose the
social roles they prefer, or fails to punish them for deviation, although
societies differ in their interest in particular infractions and in the
harshness of punishment. Most societies and subgroups within them
reinforce men's dominant roles by urging women to subordinate their
interests and relinquish their power to men. 7' And instruments of culture
such as films and television, rules of etiquette, and the division of physical
and symbolic labor, such as assigning caring and nurturing roles to women
and deflecting and preventing men from assuming such roles, are some of
the mechanisms that produce the ranking system in which women are
subordinated to men.72

The ideological character and content of laws and their promulgation
of a particular type of social order has been emphasized by a group of
legal theorists and sociologists of law in recent years.73 These critical
scholars claim that powerful groups use law to achieve their own goals,
while insisting that the law serves most people and is an outgrowth of
natural phenomena.74
70. For ways in which societies construct and reinforce gender distinctions, see id. at
118-35.
71. Id. at 137. Some societies go as far as performing acts of violence upon women
in their efforts to keep them within their traditional roles. Id. at 134. In modem western
society the traditional gender distinctions are maintained often through more subtle
methods, such as defining certain work as "women's work," physically segregating male
and female workers in a factory, or assigning males a job title for which females doing the
same work are assigned another title. Id. at 136.
72. See id. at 107-08. Women's roles are defined by expressive, nurturant, and
service-oriented characteristics, ancillary to men's; whereas men's roles are typically
instrumental, dominant, and goal-oriented. Women are prevented from attaining power
reserved for men by having roles classified by gender, thus constricting their range of
behavior.
73. For a discussion of a few of these works, see id. at 120-31.
74. Id. at 120.
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Women have been kept "in their place" by laws that restrict their

rights to control their person and property and to participate in

government.7 5 Of course, law does not cover every kind of activity.
Custom and tradition are important too, either in supporting law or in
undermining it. But law is an important legitimator of social practice and
it contributes to the establishment of norms because it defines what is
permitted and what is deviant. For most of legal history, women were
restricted by the law from obtaining both material and human capital
resources, such as credit and access to many educational institutions and

thus, were prevented from participating in the law as attorneys, judges,
and legislators.76
In law, even where a status which is not specifically geared to
characterization by gender, and in which gender-free terms have been
used, attempts have been made to genderize roles for the purpose of
including or excluding men or women from particular domains. For
example, in Britain around the turn of the century, male public officials
and leaders justified women's exclusion from the public sphere by
linguistic casuistry about whether women were included in the word
"persons"' because only "persons" had the right to a public office and
to vote.

78

75. Id. at 121.
76. Id.
77. See generally A. SACHS & J. WILSON, supra note 30, at 4-66. In Naim v.
University of St. Andrews, Sess. Cas. 147 (1909), five women graduates from Edinburgh

University attempted to exercise their right to vote for members of Parliament representing
the universities. The provision stipulated that "every person" whose name was on the
register was entitled to vote. A. SACHS & J. WILSON, supra note 30, at 29. The Lord
Chancellor ruled that the disability of women was supported by judicial precedents, and that
where it had been held that a woman could vote, it was "dicta derived from an ancient
manuscript of no weight." Id. at 30. The other opinions concurred, stating that although
the word "person" was ambiguous, the uninterrupted usage of centuries left little doubt of
it meaning "male person." Id.
78. See generally A. SACHS & 1. WILSON, supra note 30, at 4-66. Specifically, The
Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, used the word "person" throughout. 31 & 32 Viet. 877,
ch. 125. One year before, Parliament had passed a voter registration statute using the word
"man." The Representation of the People Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. 297, ch. 102, Part I,
§§ 3-6. Other parts of this act, however, used the word "person." Id. at §§ 10, 13-15, 30.
This statute was interpreted to exclude women. Chorlton v. Lings, L.R. 4 C.P. 374 (1868).
Although the statutory mandate was to interpret all statutes written in the male gender to
include females, An Act for shortening the Language used in Acts of Parliament, 1850, 13
& 14 Viet. 35, ch. 21, § 4 (known as Lord Brougham's Act), the Chorlton court declared
that while in many statutes the word "man" may include women, "in others it would be
ridiculous to suppose that the word was used in any other sense than as designating the
male sex." L.R. 4 C.P. at 386. The Act of 1867 specifically provided men, as
distinguished from women, with the franchise. Id. Also, because women were under a legal
incapacity to vote, the court limited the Act's application to men. Id. at 387.
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As evinced from the words of the nineteenth century courts, who
characterized women as too delicate, pure, and refined to undertake public
functions, and classified them legally alongside the insane and
insolvent,79 women's nature was legislated from the bench as well as
from nature. Such reasoning, even after the "person" issue was resolved,
restricted women in the legal profession,' in medicine,8" and in
academic teaching," as well as in the mines or in police and fire
departments. In the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made such
restrictions illegal. Title VIIr of the Civil Rights Act, along with Title

IX" of the Education Amendments of 1972, made it possible to change
many entrenched practices in the legal sphere at both the practice and
training level for women attorneys.' Among them, quotas limiting

79. See supra pp. 314-17 & nn. 77-78.
80. For a general overview of discriminatory practices in law schools and law firms,
see C. EPSTEIN, supra note 20; C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2; Fossum, Law Professors: A
Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Legal Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 501
(in 1975-1976 the general profile of law teachers was 96% white, 93% male, and 66%
between the ages of 30 and 50, thus reflecting the race, sex, and age discrimination
inherent in the legal profession); Weisberg, Barred from the Bar: Women and Legal
Education in the United States 1870-1890, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1977) (exclusion of
women from state bars was based upon statutory interpretation of the word "persons" to
mean "men only," as well as upon traditional common law disability); Weisberg, Women
in Law School Teaching: Problems and Progress, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 226 (1979) (19751976 ABA statistical data showed women comprised only 7.9% of all law school faculty
members, even with this figure skewed by a small number of law schools with high
women-to-men ratio of faculty members); C. Epstein, Ph.D. dissertation, supra note 60.
81. See, e.g., J. LORBER, WOMEN PHYSICIANS: CAREERS, STATUS AND POWER
(1984); M. WALSH, DOCTORS WANTED-NO WOMEN NEED APPLY: SEXUAL BARRIERS
IN THE MEDICAL PROFESSION (1977); Lorber, Women and Medical Sociology: Invisible
Professionals and Ubiquitous Patients, in ANOTHER VOICE 75 (1975); Lorber, The Limits
of Sponsorship of Women Physicians, 36 J. AM. MED. WOMEN's A. 11 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Tyack & Strober, Jobs and Gender: A History of the Structuring of
Educational Employment by Sex, in EDUCATIONAL POUCY AND MANAGEMENT: SEX
DIFFERENTIALS 131 (1981).
83. Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988)).
84. Education Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(1) (1988)).
85. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
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women's admission to law schools were eliminated, and there was a
movement to eradicate sexist references in textbooks.86

The changes in attitudes toward women in the courts did not 'come
until the 1970s when the United States Supreme Court reviewed some of

the practices that created false distinctions. A number of important cases
were decided which forbade discriminatory conduct.' All rested on the

as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
Title IX of the Education Amendments states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, except
that. . . in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall
apply only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and
graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher
education ....
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
86. Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg has told me of an old property casebook which said
that "land, like women, was meant to be possessed." Sexist examples still remain in the
casebooks. See, e.g., Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text: A Feminist
Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 1. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988); Frug, Re-reading
Contracts: A FeministAnalysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1065 (1985).
For a review of other projects investigating sex bias in textbooks, see Schneider, Task
ForceReports on Women in the Courts: The Challengefor Legal Education, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 87 (1988).
87. See, e.g. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (provision of Social Security
Act granting aid to dependent children if father but not mother is primary wage earner
violated due process clause of fifth amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
(claim of sex discrimination was cause of action under the equal protection component of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (city agency requirement that women employees
make larger contributions to its pension fund than male employees violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (employer's
policy of denying employees returning from pregnancy leave their accumulated seniority
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (Alabama statutory height and weight standards for employment in state correctional
facilities discriminated against women and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (provision of Social Security Act
allowing lower benefits for widowers over widows was a gender-based distinction
discriminating against female wage earners and violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (provision of Social Security
Act granting survivor's benefits to widows but not widowers violated the right to equal
protection secured by the due process clause of the fifth amendment because it unjustifiably
discriminated against female wage earners); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
(Louisiana constitutional and statutory requirements that a woman should not be selected
for-jury service unless she previously consented to such service in writing violated the sixth
amendment); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (company
impermissibly paid male employees who performed nightshift inspections at a higher rate
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fundamental premise that the law's differential treatment of men and
women, typically rationalized as reflecting "natural" differences,
historically had tended to contribute to women's subordination.8 8 The

than female inspectors who worked the dayshift); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leaves imposed on pregnant teachers violated due
process clause of fourteenth amendment); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(statute requiring a female but not a male member of the armed forces seeking to obtain
benefits for her spouse to prove his dependencyviolated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Idaho probate code preferring men over
women as estate administrators violated equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment);
Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer who refused to accept
job applications from women but not men with pre-school-age children violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act).
Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama statutory scheme of imposing alimony
obligations on husbands but not wives violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1978) (sex-based distinction in New
York Domestic Relations Law § 111 allowing unwed mothers but not fathers to block
adoption of illegitimate children violated equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (Illinois Probate Act allowing illegitimate children
to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Oklahoma
statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and females under
the age of 18 violated equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because the
relationship between gender and traffic safety was far too tenuous to be substantially related
to achieving the state's objective); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (Utah statute
establishing majority at age 21 for males but at age 18 for females violated equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
But see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (gender-based distinction in Georgia
statute permitting the mother but not the father of an illegitimate child an action in wrongful
death of the child not violative of the due process clause because it substantially relates to
state's objective); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (provision of Social Security
Act allowing different computation of benefits in favor of women over men not violative
of equal protection component of the duo process clause of the th amendment because
statute specifically enacted to redress society's disparate treatment of women); General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (employer's disability benefit plan excluding
pregnancy-related disabilities not violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (statute requiring mandatory discharge for
want of promotion of a male naval officer after nine years of commissioned service versus
thirteen years for a female naval officer not violative of the due process clause because of
combat and sea duty restrictions imposed on female officers); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (California disability insurance system denying coverage for certain disabilities
attributable to pregnancy not an invidious discrimination and not violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(Florida statute permitting widows but not widowers a property tax exemption not
unconstitutional because distinction has a fair and substantial relationship to the objective
of the legislation); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973) (city ordinance enjoining newspapers from publishing employment
advertisements under headings designating job preference by sex did not violate first
amendment rights).
88. Prontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

199o]

FAULTY FRAMEWORK

Court has declared that
[t]here can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic
paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.... [O]ur statute books gradually became
laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and,
indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of
women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that
of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes ......
Thus, overt discrimination based on sexual distinctions would go the way
of Plessy v. Ferguson.'° But the subtle distinctions of symbolic
segregation are still to be addressed in the 1990s.
C. The Consequences of the Difference Model for
Women in the Professional World
The process by which women have been excluded from the public
sphere and from positions of decision making has been well-expressed in
the legal profession. This exclusion has prevented them from exercising
the agency that would give them the power to define and exercise their
interests and competence as attorneys. The legal sphere also has provided
an arena in which contests between many women and professional
gatekeepers9 ' have been played out since the mid-1970s. 2 The blatant
modes of discrimination women faced have been well-documented, as well
as the subtle and informal mechanisms used by male gatekeepers to
remind women attorneys, along with the rest of the world, that the legal
profession was the domain of men and that they would protect their turf
by whatever means they could muster.'
When I first started studying women lawyers in the mid-1960s, there

89. Id. at 684-85. In Frondero, the Supreme Court held that a statute subjecting
uniformed servicewomen to stricter requirements than their male counterparts in order to
qualify for benefits was a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The
Court concluded that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race,
alienage, or national origins, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny." Id.
90. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding statute requiring separate but equal railway
accomodations based upon racial classification).
91. See supra note 11.
92. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13-22.
93. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

were not many of them to study.' I could cover certain specialties and
spheres of the law fairly well by interviewing the one or two women who
had graduated in the 1950s and somehow had managed to slip through the
obstacle course women law school graduates had to navigate before they
could hope to get a job. Those were the years when women, graduating
from the very top law schools in the country such as Stanford, Harvard,
and Columbia, could not get the jobs that men in their class, with records
far inferior to theirs, could easily obtain.' Most of the offers received
by these outstanding graduates and other women top performers were for
jobs as a legal secretary.'
• My study of women attorneys revealed that both the lack of
participation and the type of participation in the field were indicative of
the problems inherent in the profession. 7 For example, I interviewed the
first and only woman district attorney in Manhattan, two or three of the
handful of women judges, the only woman law professor in the city of
New York, several of the forty women who had jobs in large firms, and
one-third of the women (that is to say, one of the three women) who were
partners in the large Wall Street firms. I also interviewed a good number
of the women attorneys who either chose or had to settle for jobs in family
firms, in government work,9 8 in small practices where they concentrated

in what was then called domestic relations work, in real estate, or in trusts
and estates work. These were the specialties where most women attorneys
clustered. Women attorneys, virtually closed out of courtroom participation, did find a place as volunteers for the poor in the criminal courts and
were among the most outspoken advocates of a permanent place for
women in courts designed to work for the betterment and protection of
women and children.' Having found this niche for themselves, it is not
surprising that the first women to ascend to the bench were chosen to
serve as judges either in the women's juvenile courts or in the family

94. There were 7543 women lawyers in the United States in 1960, and 13,000 in
1970, mostly clustered in a few cities, such as New York, Washington, and Chicago. Id.
at 4, 100. Interviewing in and around the New York area did not substantially limit me in
developing a fairly representative sample.
95. Id. at79.
96. Id. at 84. For example, in 1952 the major west coast law firms' only offer to
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was for the position of legal secretary. Magnuson, The
Brethren's First Sister: A Supreme Court Nominee-And a Triumph for Common Sense,
TIM, July 20, 1981, at 8, 12. Judge Cecelia H. Goetz of the Bankruptcy Court of the
Eastern District of New York was not even asked to any interviews, let alone not being
offered the common $5.00 a week clerkship. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 84.
97. For a detail of the methodology used, see C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 387-99.
98. These jobs were mostly obtained by outscoring males in competitive examinations.
99. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 120-29.

.
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courts.100
Employers' assumptions regarding the special personality traits of
women led to their assignment to specialties which were usually less
prestigious, dead-end, less lucrative, and often less interesting than those
of men."0 ' Assumptions that women had less motivation and commitment
as lawyers than men made their prospects for promotion to partner poor.
Women often found themselves in "no-win" situations. They were either
regarded as not tough enough to handle business law and the stress of the
courtroom, or too tough to be regarded as easy collaborators and
partners.' 2 They were also regarded as too pure to make deals and too
caring to be tough-minded, or too stiff and unyielding to be able to make
the kinds of deals and settlements that male lawyers depended upon for the
easy, informal professional relationships that were characteristic of the
male professional life."0 3
Women who were tough-minded faced the disapproval of both men
and women colleagues, and even of feminist attorneys who faulted them
for assuming a "male model" of behavior, such as wearing clothing
regarded as "masculine" in style or otherwise deviating from sex-role
appropriate attitudes.' Women lawyers have also been faulted for
deviating from demeanor and emotional norms attached to gender roles
when they act "straight" and business-like in professional settings. "
Male colleagues find them stiff and evaluate them as interpersonally
incompetent. Women colleagues often agree."0 6
Stereotypes are also held of women judges. Like those applied to
women lawyers, the views are often inconsistent. One stereotype holds
that women judges are harsher than male judges; another stereotype,
closer to the "caring" model, maintains that women judges are apt to be
more lenient and empathetic than their male counterparts."°7 Overall, the
studies are contradictory, but many show no difference on average in their
decisions, even those having to do with rape."
100. Id. at 237-46; Cook, Women Judges: The End of Tokenism, in WOMEN IN THE
COURTs 84-105 (1978).
101. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 107-10. Many employers believed that women
preferred less stressful areas of law than litigation. In large firms, women were relegated
to "feminine" specialties such as family law and probate practice. Women who were
allowed to practice corporate law were not allowed to meet with clients.
102. Id. at 279.
103. Id. at 279, 280-81.
104. Id. at 269-71, 272.
105. Id. at 281-82.
106. Id. at 280, 287-88.
107. Id. at 244-45.
108. See Gruhl, Spohn &Welch, Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges,
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In 1989 the issue of sexual stereotypes affecting women's professional
career advancement was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'° Ann B. Hopkins was a successful senior
manager in the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse who had secured a
$25 million contract with the Department of State."' Although her work
performance was exemplary, she was denied a partnership in the firm. She
brought a title VII suit against Price Waterhouse in 1985 alleging that the
denial was discriminatory because it was based on sexual stereotyping."'1
During the application process, Hopkins was advised by a head partner to
"walk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry."" Previously, other women candidates
for partnerships were rejected because the "partners believed that they
were curt, brusque 13
and abrasive, acted like 'Ma Barker' or tried to be
'one of the boys.'"' Judge Gerhard A. Gesell held that Hopkins had
proved that sex discrimination did play a role in this employment decision,
and that the burden had shifted to Price Waterhouse to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the decision would have been the same without
the discrimination, a burden that the defendant did not sustain. 1 4 On
appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court not only affirmed the
district court's decision but allowed an even greater recovery. 5

25 AM. J.POL. Sci. 308 (1981) (study of 30,000 felony cases found few significant
differences in the conviction rates of male and female judges); Kritzer & Uhman,
Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex ofJudges and Defendant in Criminal Case Dispositions,
14 Soc. Sci. J.77 (1977) (no difference between male and female judges); but cf. Cain,
Good and Bad Bias:... A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S.CAL. L. RLrV.
1945 (1988) (commenting on a method of dichotomous judicial decision making); Resnik,
On the Bias: FeministReconsiderations of the Aspirationsfor Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1878 (1988) (advocating a feminist approach to judicial decisions); Walker & Barrow,
The Diversificationof the Federal Bench: Policy and ProcessRamfications, 47 J.PoLITics
596 (1985) (women judges exhibit greater tendency to defer to the government's position
than male judges). The jury is still out on Judge Kimba M. Wood's ten-year sentence of
Michael R. Milken. See Eichenwald, Judge Who Gave Milken 10 Years Wants Him Eligible
for Parole in 3, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at Al, col. 1; Eichenwald, The Milken
Sentence: Milken Gets 10 Years for Wall St. Cimes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1990, at Al,
col. 6.
109. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
110. Id. at 231, 233.
111. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113-14 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
112. Id. at 1117.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1120.
115. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490
U.S. 228 (1989).
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The Court, in a 6-3 decision," 6 found that the discrimination was
obvious and substantial, declaring that
[i]t takes no special training to discern sex-stereotyping in a
description of an aggressive female employee as requiring "a
course at charm school." Nor . . .does it require expertise in
psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed "interpersonal
skills" can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal
skills that has drawn the criticism." 7
The Court, however, reversed the court of appeal's judgment and
remanded the case, disagreeing with the clear and convincing standard
imposed by the lower courts. The Court declared that the "defendant may
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the plaintiff's gender into account."118 This reversal is significant
because now, after Hopkins, professional firms that discriminate against
women applicants have an easier burden to sustain in order to avoid
liability.
Appraisals of feminine characteristics remain a problem for women
lawyers and those in a position to assess their performance. Yet, there has
been a revolution in the lawyering workplace. Women are, indeed, a
formidable presence because a larger number are obtaining degrees and
entering the profession and, at entry levels at least, women have been
welcomed. Ironically, this opportunity has caused distress for young
women who worry how they will manage to reconcile childcare and
career." 9 In the past, few women could find employment in these firms,
and the few who did had little prospect of advancement, no matter how
hard they worked."n Now that there is greater possibility of promotion
for commitment and effort, they must make the hard choices, choices that

116. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989). The plurality decision
was written by Justice Brennan, and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens;
Justices White and O'Connor wrote separate concurrences; and Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented. Id.
117. Id. at 256.
118. Id. at 258.
119. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 358-79. The problem of balancing workplace
demands has forced many couples to either postpone having children or to decide not to
have them at all.
120. See id. at 175-218. Only a tiny number of women attorneys worked in large New
York law firms prior to 1940, and those that did were intentionally provided only backroom
assignments, keeping them out of the courtroom.
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were not possible in the past."'
The opportunity to work the amount of hours required by firms to
become a partner may be of small comfort to the young women attorneys
who have entered or will be entering the profession. Today, women
attorneys must face the daily problems of coordination of home and family
responsibilities. The time management of family and career still burdens
the woman attorney, although there has been some slight movement on the
part of large firms to provide such services as emergency childcare and
part-time work, which in few firms will lead to partnership.
But to move from the individual level to the aggregate is useful in
understanding this problem historically and comparatively. We can see
which issues relate to individual decisions and which are clearly
institutional or time sequence problems. As Mr. Justice Holmes once
remarked: "A page of history is worth a volume of logic.""
Thus, it is instructive to point out that most of the women lawyers
who have ever lived are living today." Furthermore, about eighty
percent of the 100,000 women lawyers who are today in practice were
admitted to the bar after the 1970s. 1 1 This means the demographic
profile of women lawyers is considerably different from that of male
lawyers. Men are distributed over the entire adult life span, while the
women are disproportionately young and are thinking about their
biological clocks as they approach their mid-thirties and forties. This also
means that under the best of circumstances, women have less experience,
and only recently have a sizable number of them met the criteria for
partnership and other decision-making posts in the profession. This creates
problems for women, of course, but it has also created problems for the
firms that have been asked to change their policies to be responsive to a
sizeable number of women with childbearing and childrearing
responsibilities. If women had always been permitted free entry into the
legal profession, then they, like men, would be at different stages of the
life cycle and firms would not have as many women who need flexibility
in hours and time off."z Furthermore, there is a focus on women's
family responsibilities which highlights "difference," both biological (since
women are the ones who give birth) and ideological (because there is a

121. Id.
122. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 348 (1921).
123. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 4-5.
124. Id.
125. I am not at this time dealing with the possibility that men also could have shared
those responsibilities and thus, also would need the same accommodations from firms that
are linked to women and "women's roles." Of course, more men do express the desire to

engage in family life to a greater degree than ever before. Also, gender ideology often
creates an obstacle in that there is less legitimation for their desire in this regard.
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consensus that it is women's main responsibility to assume primary care
of infants), as a result of the cohort effects of past discrimination.
The cohort effect has consequences for women in all types of firms.
It may make women themselves more self-conscious of their
"differences," partly because the problems are considered "women's
problems" and not family or social problems, and because most women
accept these role designations. Many of them (but, I suspect, not most of
them) also accept a gender difference ideology that maintains that they
have different orientations toward careers because of their different
personalities. What women "want," in terms of kinds of careers, is
affected in the aggregate by a combination of possibilities in the
opportunity structure of law (i.e., what kinds of jobs they can get given
the now subtle but nevertheless pervasive discrimination beyond the entry
level), the compatibility they and their employers perceive with other role
responsibilities, and the social controls and ideologica9l pressures from
their families and peers to make the "right" choices. Of course, these
decisions are also affected by their social backgrounds, their race and
religion, the quality of the law school they attended, their rank in their
class, and their own economic situation. Middle and upper class white
women who have had prestigious educations may have more opportunity
to have the highest ranking jobs, but they also have the most opportunity
to "decide" that the time demands of these kinds of legal work are
incompatible with their other duties and interests. Thus, these jobs may
not be "worth it" because they are not driven to them by economic
motivation.
Of course, too, today there is highlighted attention to problems
because greater consciousness has produced it. The consciousness has
produced a good deal of the hand-wringing and upset that we are
witnessing today. This is true not only for women in law, but for women
in other occupations, such as business management. There is also a great
deal of media attention devoted to some of the issues which seems to
center on the problems women encounter as professionals, offering a kind
of doomsday portrait of careers for women. The success stories and
satisfactions that women attorneys experience are rarely documented."2
One thing is clear, however. The entry of women into the law has
been firmly institutionalized. Approximately forty percent of the law
students in the country are women and this proportion continues to
increase slowly." 7 Certain changes do seem to be firmly in place. There

126. See, e.g., Shad, Working Part 7ime Without Paying the Penalty, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 1990, at B7, col. 3; Bouton, Linda Fairstein vs. Rape, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 21.
127. Lhamon, Quality ofLife Issues This Recruiting Season, N.Y.L.J, Aug. 28, 1990,
at 2, col. 3. In fact, I suspect that, as the number approaches 50%, we can expect
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is opportunity at entry-level jobs, women have greater confidence in their
technical abilities, and there has been a change in gender ideology with
regard to women's ability to engage in most aspects of the lawyering
process."n What is not so firmly set, however, is the opportunity for
advancement to the very top of the ladder; the acceptance of women in the
informal domain of the profession. Stereotypes remain about women's
interpersonal qualities and attributes and a continuing belief in innate
qualities which are presumed to be salient to the practice of law. Today,
even if women do not have to bear the insults of "ladies days" in law
school, 1 or the humiliations of going up the back steps of private clubs
at which their firms do business, 1" or the discouragement of knowing
they would never make partnership in a firm in which they had a major
commitment of time and energy,"' they must still deal with the subtle
messages in the profession and in the larger culture that they are "a breed
apart."
It is not only men who monitor gender-appropriate norms. Both
feminist-identified and non-feminist women also condemn women who do
not conform to behavioral and attitudinal femininity norms because they
are assertive in the quest for monetary success and insufficiently- "caring"
or "nurturant" in their interpersonal interactions. Women in firms who
want to leave early to be with their children have a hard time, but women
who stay late are regarded as heartless by the same men who set the
standards.
D. Professional Opportunities and Gender Stereotyping
Stereotypes regarding women's priorities and positions as wives and
mothers affect their opportunities as professionals. Yet by now there is an
accumulating body of data that women who are successful in
male-dominated professions disproportionately tend to be married and have
children." Although the conventional wisdom is that marriage and
children are impediments to a woman's career success, there are good
reasons to explain the seeming paradox. First, although these professional

considerable efforts to limit the free entry of women.
128. Although some maintain that women prefer mediation to courtroom strife, there
is clearly a range of preference among women.

129. See C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 66-67. "Ladies days" were a common practice
in the early days of women law students, whereby on certain days only the female students

were quizzed and asked to recite intricate legal issues.
130. Id. at 283-85.

131. Id. at 175-218.
132. Cole & Zuckerman, Marriage, Motherhood and Research Performance in

Science, SCI. AM., Feb. 1987, at 129.
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women may have careers that are deviant from other women's, they are
conforming to social expectations regarding a normal woman's life. This
may make them more acceptable working partners to men who may regard
single career women as too interested in the social opportunities that work
provides. Furthermore, since women in professional life disproportionately
tend to be married to men in their own fields, their husbands' reputations
often reflect on their own, and further, may give them access to networks
and business contacts they might not have had independently. In some
sense, then, there are not only normative aspects of women's roles that
extend into their professional lives, but structural elements as well that
smooth their way.
Thus, we see how gender stereotyping and dichotomous thinking leads
to inequality. Even well-intentioned dichotomizing, giving honor and
respect to the so-called special qualities of women, whether by jurists,
lawyers, or social scientists, seems to lead to unintended consequences,
which often have negative outcomes for women.
In my own studies of women in law during the past two decades,133
which focused on the wide range of traits and qualities exhibited by
women attorneys and judges, I could see no basis for the expectation that
substantial changes could be predicted in the profession merely because of
the participation of women, and this has come true in some ways. In
concluding that book, it seemed appropriate to note that "no one group
ought to be burdened with the expectation of unilateral altruism." 1"
They may engage in such behavior, but typically as a component of
traditional women's roles, normatively prescribed, and socially enforced
through punishments for deviation, or they come to them because of their
commitment to political ideals. It is no longer uncommon for women
lawyers for the defense and the prosecution to square off on matters of
crime, the environment, and the negotiations of trade.

m11.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the assignments of specific role prescriptions too
often have the consequence of subjugating women. Moreover, women
have been vulnerable to patronizing attitudes, to discrimination, and to
other forms of unequal treatment because of stereotypes that link them to
these attitudes. This does not mean women should not act in common
cause as they do have collective concerns and may respond in patterned
ways to differential treatment. But women's position in society as
outsiders to the establishment, or in their unique roles as mothers, does

133. See generally C. EPSTEIN, supra note 2.
134. Id. at 385. Evidence does not show that women possess altruistic or caring
qualities "naturally."
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not necessarily predict a common set of behaviors or attitudes. There are
as many differences among women as there are among men and between
both men and women.
Many feminist scholars today are either committed to a difference
model or leaning toward its acceptance because of their commitment to
humanistic values and a desire to change society. Their perspective has
certainly alerted social scientists and the legal community to insensitivities
regarding the role of women. But all scholars must act with caution to
avoid the pitfalls that so characterized the biased analyses of the past.
Models are social constructions which may hinder or expand our
perception and knowledge. We must differentiate between those that serve
our ideological agendas and those that inform us about the nature of
reality.

